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The Capital Gains "Holding" Dilemma
Allen Sultan*
An important question under the capital gains provisions of the
revenue laws is the meaning of the term "hold." The author studies
judicial concepts of "holding" and concludes that inconsistencies have
been introduced by judicial reaction to changing concepts of property.
Noting that past legislative attempts to remedy the situation have been
fruitless, he issues a call for "enlightened" congressional action.
[T]axation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it
is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for
which the tax is paid. Holmes, J., in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376,
378 (1930).
I.
Back in 1930, the United States Supreme Court declared that "in-
come that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is
free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income,
whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not."1 This general principle, recently
characterized by the Court as "one of the basic precepts of the income
tax law,"2 appears to have had far-reaching ramifications.
3
In the area of deductions, this emphasis on this concept of "domin-
ion'1 a was applied within a short time to a situation wherein property
Wisiting Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Oklahoma.
1. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
2. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 303 (1961).
3. It was quite consistent, therefore, when that tribunal stated in its leading decision
ten years later that "the power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership
of it." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940).
3a. This legal conception of "dominion" vik a via "title" probably grew out of the use
of the "writ of right" (de recta tenendo) when Henry II "ordained that no action for a
freehold land shall be begun in a manorial court without such a writ." When, in this
manner, the king's justices took cognizance of the possessory assizes, Henry II took
into control the replacing into possession (seisin), those who claim to have been
unjustly deprived of their land. This procedure of repossession by the disseised in-
dividual, done by means of the writ, did not in theory look into the matter of title
or ownership; however, the king's justices soon were not too discriminating with re-
spect to the limitations of their jurisdiction. MAiTAND, THE CoNsT'rroNAL HsToRY
OF ENGLAND 112 (1st paperback ed. 1961). For the use of "dominion" as a basis
for imposing the federal gift tax, see Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933);
Bradford, J. C. 34 T.C. 1051 (1960).
An excellent example of the extent of these ramifications can be seen in the recent
decision of David L. Zips, 38 T.C. No. 62 (Aug. 14, 1962), wherein it was held
that, "the value of property received by taxpayer was includible in gross income when
it was 'held' and used under complete dominion and control. The fact that valid title
was not acquired and that taxpayer's use and possession were assailable by someone
535
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was held under a "lease" agreement by a taxpayer after he had con-
veyed it to the lessor as security for a loan. Speaking for the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Black stated that the transaction was in reality a
mortgage, and that the taxpayer, having "dominion-but not title-
over the property, would be permitted the "depreciation deduction."4
At first blush, it would appear that there would be no substantial
difference between the treatment of property "held for the production
of income" under the depreciation provisions, 5 and property "held"
by the taxpayer under the capital gains provisions of the revenue
laws.6  Consistency would certainly demand similar results since
capital gains treatment is granted to depreciable property disposed of
through either sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion.7 Conse-
quently, the apprehension of a contrary situation suggests an investi-
gation into judicial concepts of "holding" under the federal capital
gains provisions.
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court, faced with a split in the
circuits, interpreted the term "held" as used in the capital gains pro-
visions of the Revenue Act of 1928. The confusion surrounding the
meaning of that term in the federal courts was evidenced by the fact
that in ruling upon five cases decided by four different circuit courts,
the Supreme Court reversed three decisions from two of the four cir-
cuits and affirmed the other two decisions. Moreover, the three re-
versals were in cases that affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals, and the
two affirmations were in cases where the board and the district court
were reversed upon appeal to circuit.
To compound this lack of unanimity, the Supreme Court itself was
with a better title did not prevent inclusion of the amounts in income." Such a broad
interpretation of the gross income provisions of § 61(a) of the 1954 Code is to be
expected'in light of the 1961 Supreme Court decision of James v. United States, 366
U.S. 213 (1961), which "devitalized" its earlier opinion in Commissioner v. Wilcox,
327 U.S. 404 (1946).
4. "While it may more often be that he who is both owner and user bears the
burden of wear and exhaustion of business property in the nature of capital, one who
is not the owner may nevertheless bear the burden of exhaustion of capital investment
..... [T]he transaction between the taxpayer and the trustee bank, in written form
a transfer of ownership with a lease back, was actually a loan secured by the property
involved. . . . In the field of taxation . . . the courts are concerned with substance
and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding." Helvering v.
F. & R.'Lazarus Co., 308 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1939). See also Cladding Dry Goods Co.,
2 B.T.A. 336 (1925).
Indeed, in 1926 the Government permitted depreciation to be taken in a purchase
situation "from the time possession and the burdens and benefits of ownership are
transferred to him, or when the deed passes, whichever occurs first." I.T. 2275,
V-1 Ctr. BurLL. 62 (1926).
5. "There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance
for exhaustion, wear and tear . . . of property held for the production of income."
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a) (2).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
7. IrNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
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divided upon the construction of the term "hold." In the decision of
McFeely v. Commissioner,8 Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone
registered a terse dissent "on the ground succinctly stated" in a de-
cision rendered six months earlier by the Second Circuit. In this latter
decision, a per curiam opinion by Judges L. Hand, Swan, and Chase,
the court said that the word "held" was "indeed colloquial," and that
it does not always imply possession.9 In sharp contrast, the Supreme
Court's later definition stated that "In common understanding to hold
property is to own it. In order to own or hold one must acquire. The
date of acquisition is, then, the one from which to compute the dura-
tion of ownership or the length of holding."'1 Having thus equated
"hold" with "acquired," the next problem was to define the latter term.
A partial attempt to do so was made the following year when the
Court explained that "acquired" was "not a term of art in the law of
property but one in common use." It declared that the plain import of
the word is "obtained as one's own,"11 an equation adopted by state
12
as well as federal courts.
13
In McFeely the Supreme Court also held that the title to property is
acquired for holding period purposes by a legatee or next of kin at
the date of decedents death. This was in accord with its decision the
year before that the periods during which property was held by the
trustor and trustee may be added for purposes of satisfying the two-
year definitional requirement of the 1921 revenue statute.' 4 Both
executor (or administrator) and trustee are fiduciaries, and the prob-
lem of possible differing basis,15 although presently accounted for,16
was said by the Court not to be "inconsistent and that each should
be read as affecting the subject to which alone it applies."
17
Six years later the Supreme Court announced, as a corollary to this
principle, the rule that the holding period of property purchased by
a testamentary trust begins, in the hands of the beneficiary, on the date
of purchase by the trustees.'8 Complying with the ramifications of
utilizing the acquisition of equitable title as governing the transaction,
8. 296 U.S. 102, 113 (1935).
9. Ogle v. Helvering, 77 F.2d 338, 339 (2d Cir. 1935).
10. 296 U.S. at 107. In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts' conclusions were
contrary to those of his dissent in the ease of Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292
U.S. 455 (1934), decided a year earlier on almost the same facts.
11. Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. 496, 499 (1936).
12. Boss v. Polk County, 236 Iowa 384, 391, 19 N.W.2d 225, 228 (1945).
13. Shattuck v. Helvering, 119 F.2d 902, 903 (2d Cir. 1941).
14. Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 467 (1934).
15. Due to application of § 113(a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 819
(1928).
16. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1223(2).
17. McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 112 (1935).
18. Helvering v. Gambrill, 313 U.S. 11, 14 (1941); Helvering v. Campbell, 313
U.S. 15, 20 (1941).
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Mr. Justice Douglas declared that an interest did not have to"ripen" into full and complete ownership for purposes of capital gains
holding, and, consequently, that the fact that an interest is vested,
contingent, or conditional is "inconsequential."
II.
Looking to the results of the application of these rules in subsequent
litigation, one discerns a definite pattern. Aside from cases involving
insufficient information, 19 public policy,20 or conversion of a retained
asset for a different tax purpose,2' the lower court decisions appear to
fall into three general groups: those that involve action on the part
of an instrumentality of the state; those that adhere strictly in principle
to the Supreme Court decisions; and those that allow some leeway in
their interpretation.
Generally, when a judicial, legislative, or administrative act con-
stitutes a necessary element in the completion of the transaction,
courts determine the holding period to begin at the date of the act. 2
Thus, the period has been held to begin when a statutory right of
possession attached to a leasehold,2 when the requirements of local
law were satisfied,24 and when a requisite court approval of contract
rights was obtained.25
19. Kessler v. United States, 124 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1941).
20. When taxpayer uses an agent as a conduit for a tax evasion scheme, his holding
period ends with the commencement of the scheme and is not affected by the period
the agent subsequently held the property. Deal v. Morrow, 197 F.2d 821, 827 (5th
Cir. 1952).
21. Petitioner constructed a residence in 1921 and converted it into rental property
in 1930. In determining the loss resulting from its sale in 1934 it was said to have
been "held" from the earlier date. Kay KimbelL, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940).
For the suggestion that the adding of the two holding periods be permitted only
when both are capital assets, see Report of Ways & Means Committee (Internal Revenue
Code of 1954), H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1954).
22. An excellent example of the soundness of the principle in using official acts can
be seen in the recent decision of Wagar Lumber Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp.
388 (W.D. Wash. 1960).
23. Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1954).
The issue was the period that a surrendered leasehold was held by the lessee under
a statutory continuance.
24. E. F. Blaise, 42 B.T.A. 1232 (1940), rev'd on other grounds, 126 F.2d 383
(10th Cir. 1942). See also R. O'Brien & Co. v. United States, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R.
1249 (D. Mass. 1956).
25. Vincent Coraci, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 533 (1954). Although the registration
of notes does not affect the holding period, this is probably due to the fact that such
registration is a ministerial act, rather than a discretionary one; solely for the protec-
tion of the public, it is a commercial matter in which the state's limited interest is
sustained by the principle of caveat emptor. Since primary consideration for legal acts
strengthens the law and its administration, it is unfortunate that the principle embodied
in this group of cases cannot be extended to all areas amenable to its application.
With respect to patents, see Thompson v. Johnson, 42 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.
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The second group of cases attempts to follow closely the interpre-
tive policy of the Supreme Court. They equate "acquisition" with
ownership, and the latter with transfer of title under applicable state
law. As a consequence of this formula, which is adhered to by state
courts26 as well as the Internal Revenue Service, the holding periods
have been held to begin with purchase and delivery, and not subse-
quent payment,2 even though the amount of consideration is in-
definite at the time of transfer.29 Similarly, it has been held that the
period does not begin until release of the property from escrow,30
that assets obtained from liquidation are held from the date of the
liquidation,31 that the disposition by means of conditional sale
terminates seller's holding period notwithstanding retention of install-
ment obligations, 32 and that an option or contract to buy does not
commence buyers' holding period, which rather awaits subsequent
payment and possession.-'
In addition, "acquisition" was held to begin the period for stock
acquired (a) in a recapitalization pursuant to previous contracts to
exchange,34 and (b) under a contract to purchase stock held by a third
party, the earlier agreements in each case being characterized as
executory contracts and not ones of sale.-s In like manner, the period
was held to begin when stock was issued in exchange for bonds, and
not on the earlier date when bonds were obtained as security for
purposes of reorganization.36 Similarly, only final distribution of the
1950); Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Samuel E.
Diescher, 36 B.T.A. 732 (1937), aff'd, 110 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1940); G.C.M. 21507,
1939-2 Crr. BULL. 189 (acquiescence in the Diescher case).
26. Boss v. Polk County, 236 Iowa 384, 391, 19 N.W.2d 225, 228 (1945).
27. Rev. Rul. 220, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 210.
28. George S. Lavin, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 228 (1944).
29. Patterson v. Hightower, 245 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1957) (call contract); William
A. Cluff, 17 T.C. 225 (1951).
30. Howell's Estate, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 918 (1943), aff'd, 140 F.2d 765 (5th
Cir. 1944). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit said the holding must be for oneself, and,
consequently not that of a bailee. 140 F.2d at 767. See also William U. Watson, 8
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 357 (1949) (debentures); Albert E. Dyke, 6 T.C. 1134 (1946).
31. Thomas R. Reyburn, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 680 (1946). Cf. Mattison v. United
States, 163 F. Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1958), where the court, implying the decision
would be contra if title had passed, stated: "It is the clear implication of several of
the cases involving the reporting of gains or losses realized on corporate liquidation
that whether or not an amount received on an installment liquidation is long or short
term gain is determined by the length of time that has passed between the purchase
of the stock and the actual receipt of the amount on which gain is realized." Id. at
758.
32. In re Rogers" Estate, 143 F.2d 695, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1944), citing congressional
committee reports to § 44(d) of the 1939 Code.
33. Max M. Wyman, 33 T.C. 622 (1959); Marian L. Bloxom, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
104 (1950).
34. Fleda F. Iverson, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 777 (1943).
35. Ethlyn L. Armstrong, 6 T.C. 1166 (1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1947).
36. Kinkel v. McGowan, 188 F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1951).
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assets of an employee's trust began the employee's holding period,
since prior to such distribution title was vested in the trustee.37 Nor
does the retention of proxy rights and an option to repurchase con-
tinue seller's period, since title vests in buyer, and a new period begins
upon exercise of the option.38 Finally, when more than one govern-
mental act is involved in the transfer of property, as exemplified above
with respect to condemnation, the time title vests determines the
period of holding.39
When the ramifications of the principles established by the Supreme
Court would result in decisions that appear inequitable in result or
illogical in theory, courts usually have tended to establish inroads in
the application of title as the guide to determining the period of hold-
ing. Thus, "constructive receipt" was used to grant a sole stockholder
favored tax treatment even though the stock was not issued within
the statutory period.40 Similarly, the period that bonds were held
commenced with the contract of sale prior to their issuance4' as that
was the time the rights of the parties became fixed.4 Indeed, a like
result occurred when the stock that was subsequently authorized and
issued constituted part of the consideration for a loan.43
In 1941, the Court of Claims established a limitation on the Supreme
Court's rule with respect to the holding period of the beneficiary of a
trust. In a four-to-one decision it held that the period does not com-
mence until the death of the trustor if the trust is revocable at the
trustor's will.44 Although the Supreme Court in McFeely clearly dis-
associated basis from holding period, the Court of Claims cited as
authority for its decision a portion of the Conference Committee Re-
port on the Revenue Act of 1928, a reference to the basis of
37. Harvey S. Strassburger, 37 B.T.A. 881 (1938).
38. Max M. Wyman, 33 T.C. 622 (1959). This is in accord with § 1223(6) of the
1954 Code, discussed below.
39. Commissioner v. Kieselbach, 127 F.2d 359, 362 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S.
399 (1943).
40. Albert K. Orth, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 452 (1952). Subsequent issuance
"merely reflected a capital interest which he already had and constituted no new
asset with a new holding period." Id. at 453.
41. C. A. Sporl & Co., 40 B.T.A. 829 (1939), aft'd, 118 F.2d 283 (Sth Cir. 1941).
42. Commissioner v. C. A. Sporl & Co., 118 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1941).
43. W. F. Marsh, 12 T.C. 1083 (1949). Based partially upon the authority of
Sporl, the court said that "there was never any doubt" that petitioners and their
associates would be the holders of the stock. This was evidenced by the back-dating
of the stock to the date of agreement, which was also the time of the completed
performance of the taxpayer's part of the agreement. Cf. James L. Meldon, 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 765 (1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1955), where a deposit made
pursuant to an oral agreement did not commence the holding period. Rather, it was
held to be the subsequent written agreement, which was presumed in law to express
their final understanding.
44. Fifth Avenue Bank v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 428 (Ct. C1. 1941).
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property in a revocable trust.45 In his dissent, Judge Whitaker pointed
out that the quote with reference to basis does not necessarily apply
to holding periods. In addition, he contended that to "hold" to an
ordinary man connotes title, i.e., the right to exercise the incidents of
ownership, which the settlor does not possess.
III.
To ascertain wherein lie the inconsistencies of these cases, we need
but go back to the original Supreme Court decisions. In them the
Court, over notable dissent, proclaimed its adherence to a property-
inspired rule of title. However, although it spoke of "title," it seemed
to have meant "equitable title"; for the very cases that proclaimed the
rule contradicted it by tacking on the period that title was held by a
fiduciary to that of the beneficiary. Thus, the guideposts established
in the Court's holdings contained at the outset the seeds of their own
contradiction.
The Supreme Court decisions, therefore, had the effect of granting
considerable leeway to lower tribunals in their interpretation of the
term "hold." Aside from cases involving governmental action, when-
ever the lower court's attempt to apply the principle of legal title
would lead to clearly improper results, it was able to use other de-
vices, such as constructive receipt, to gain an equitable and just result.
Such use may have satisfied the equation that to "hold" is to "acquire,"
but it did little to enhance the concept of title, and thereby to develop
that property approach to the term. Indeed, quite paradoxically, it
fostered an early developing concept of "dominion," and, consequently,
an English "production of income" approach to the definition.
A few courts, as noted above, have attempted to follow the fiat of
the Supreme Court to its extreme application. The results of such a
religious construction of the concept of title were recently evidenced
in the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts in
O'Brien v. United States.4 Although adhering to this concept as the
determining factor for the commencement of the holding period, the
court held that trawlers and their engines, though sold as a unit, may
be separated for holding period purposes if purchased at different
times, and that the taxpayer did not own, and therefore hold, one of
the engines until it was completely paid for, due to the provisions of
the contract of sale.
Another resulting incongruity is reflected in the cases dealing with
45. Id. at 431. The Report stated: "In view of the complete right of revocation
. . . it is proper to view the property for all practical purposes as belonging to the
grantor rather than the beneficiary and . . . vesting in the beneficiary . . . on the
date of the grantor's death."
46. 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1249 (D. Mass. 1956). See note 24 supra.
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the so-called "split" or "divided" holding period. Its first significant
appearance was on February 9, 1934, when the Board of Tax Appeals
decided the case of Ellen Ayer Wood.47 Reasoning that the exercise
of a stock option is "analogous to ... a purchase of stock," the Board
held that the date the right was exercised commenced the holding
period of the stock obtained thereby. Rejecting the tax-payer's con-
tention that the period began with the acquisition of the parent stock
which produced the option rights, the Board, maintaining its earlier
position, pointed out that "whether or not the stockholder's interest
will be the same after issuance of rights to subscribe depends upon
whether or not such rights are exercised by the stockholder." Upon
appeal by the taxpayer, the Board's decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which held that part of each
share of stock is a capital asset, even if not held for the specified
period, if it was purchased under rights to subscribe that were held
for such period. To justify this doctrine of apportionment, the court
reasoned that,
when new capital is added to the assets of an existing corporation each
share represented by the certificates issued therefor is not a share in the
new capital alone, but automatically spreads over and attaches itself to the
whole and every part of the corporation and the old certificates likewise
automatically come to represent interests in the new as well as the old. 49
One year after this decision came down, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals was faced with the same problem. Quoting the above
rationale, the court adopted the principle recently applied by their
brethren to the north.5
On July 14, 1942, seven years after the First Circuit decided the
Wood case, and after that decision was also followed by the Seventh
Circuit, the House Ways and Means Committee suggested amendatory
47. 29 B.T.A. 1050 (1934), revd, 75 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1935).
48. Rodman E. Griscom, 22 B.T.A. 979 (1931).
49. Wood v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 364, 366-67 (1st Cir. 1935).
50. Macy v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1936). Although this view was
perhaps strengthened two weeks later by a Supreme Court decision holding a real
estate option of purchase to be valuable property, within a year the same Supreme
Court refused to extend the principle to a situation where prefered stock having a
basis of zero was issued as a dividend on common. Under such circumstances, wrote
Mr. Justice Brandeis, the preferred stock constituted income, and, whether taxed or
not, possesses its own holding period. Commissioner v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co.,
297 U.S. 496, rehearing denied, 297 U.S. 728, motion to withhold mandate denied,
85 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1936); Commissioner v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, rehearing
denied, 302 U.S. 781 (1937). Caveat: These rules with respect to a stock dividend
(in contrast to an option) have been amended by statute. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
307(a) determines the basis by means of allocation between the stock distributed, and
the stock with respect to which the distribution was made; § 1223(1) includes the
holding period of the original stock in that of the new stock.
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legislation. In its report to Congress,51 the Committee pointed out
that the administrative difficulty caused by the rule of apportionment
was obvious, and, at times, "becomes absolutely unworkable."52 As
a result of this suggestion, and a similar one the same year by the
Senate Finance Committee,5 3 Congress added section 117(h) (6) to
the Code-presently section 1223(6). Representing Congress' desire
to obtain "a simple, uniform, and administratively workable solution,"
it provided that
the holding period of stock acquired in the exercise of stock rights shall date,
in every case and whether or not receipt of taxable gain was recognized in
connection with the distribution of the rights, from the day upon which the
rights to acquire such stock were exercised.5 4
One might believe that this promulgation would constitute a guide
for judicial resolutions of similar problems; the impact of McFeely,
however, was such that the "word game" was again to be utilized to
"split" or "divide" the holding period of property. Taxpayer, M. A.
Paul, had sold an apartment building which he had constructed upon
his property, and which had been completed within the minimum
six-month holding period. Reversing the Tax Court, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the "portion of the gain which is properly
allocable to that part of the building which was erected more than six
months before the sale may be given long-term capital gain treatment"
in petitioners' 1946 return.
55
Although Circuit Judge Staley, in his opinion in the Paul case, felt
that the problem was so rare that it would not "materially harass the
Commissioner," in a very short time the Tax Court was again con-
sidering the very same situation. Harold and Claire Williams claimed
long-term capital gains treatment in their 1947 return on the gain
realized from the sale of a tankship. The vessel had been sold
51. H.R. REP,. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1942).
52. The Report explained that: "In any case where there is a series of stock rights
issued by a corporation and exercised by a shareholder, the rule becomes absolutely
unworkable, since, in the case of the later issues in the series, the property element
representing the stock right will be computed with reference to old stock which in
turn has a holding period computed with reference to other old stock. The result is a
pyramiding of stock lots each with a different holding period. It has been estimated
that six issues of rights, if exercised, will result in no less than 64 different lots."
H.R. RE'. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1942).
53. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 121-22 (1942).
54. The House Report justified the chosen solution by "the fact that, normally,
much the greater proportion of the basis pertaining to stock acquired in the exercise of
stock rights is attributable to the subscription price. The stock right represents so
small a property element that it can be eliminated from the computation without
inequity, and with benefits to taxpayer and Treasury through the elimination of
complexities." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1942).
55. Paul v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 763, 764 (3d Cir. 1953).
1963]
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pursuant to an agreement that was concluded less than six months
after their acquisition of the hull from which they constructed the
tanker. However, the satisfaction of conditions subsequent in the
contract resulted in the registration of the ship and execution of the
bill of sale at a later date, one well within the statutory requirement of
section 117 of the 1939 code. In its decision the Fifth Circuit, citing
Paul, once again reversed the Tax Court. In so doing, it remanded
the case to that court, with instructions to apportion the gain between
long and short-term, and to determine whether the basis should be
value or cost.56 On remand, Judge Van Fossen, in adopting the
Commissioner's method of allocation, 7 reiterated his earlier position
that a completed tanker was the object of the sale.
Seven days after Judge Van Fossen's opinion came down the Tax
Court decided the cause of Fred and Carrie Draper. They had de-
ducted as an ordinary loss on their 1949 joint return the casualty loss
of a building they had constructed for use in their business. 9 On May
29, 1959, the Tax Court held that the loss of their self-constructed
section 1231 asset, destroyed six months or less after its completion,
must be apportioned for the purpose of reducing the amount of gain
on other assets used in the trade or business realized in the same year.
It also held that it did not matter that the Paul case involved a sale or
exchange and the instant one deals with a casualty, since the "central
point" in both is whether the asset had been held for more than six
months. 60 In this manner the Tax Court, after twice being reversed,
had to abandon the principle of a completed asset, and thus bow to
higher judicial authority. Recent administrative 61 and judicial 2 pro-
nouncements testify to the continued establishment of the doctrine of
dividing the taxpayer's holding period. This is true even though such
splitting seems to defy both logic and congressional intent as evi-
denced by its enactment of the stock option provision, a "simple,
uniform, and administratively workable solution."
56. Williams v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1958). "Obviously something
more than the hull... was acquired ... and sold .. ." Id. at 155.
57. Taxpayer adopted the "cost" or completed construction concept, but argued
it should be computed from the total sale price excluding the cost of acquiring the
hull. The Commissioner's method, the one adopted by the court, considered the cost
of acquisition and rebuilding as part of the investment in the asset.
It is noteworthy that the regulations implementing § 167(c)(1) of the Code, with
respect to the construction, reconstruction or erection of capital assets to qualify a
portion for accelerated depreciation, uses the cost of completed construction as the
basis for allocation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(c)-i (1960).
58. Harold G. Williams, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 460 (1959).
59. Pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(j), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 846
(1942).
60. Fred Draper, 32 T.C. 545 (1959).
61. Rev. Rul. 62-140, 1962 INT. REv. BULL. No. 34, at 18.
62. United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961). Cf. Goldstein v. Allen,
306 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1962).
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IV.
A capital asset should be viewed as a res, an object of property, be
it a bond, a stock option, or a partially constructed asset. However, for
purposes of sound tax administration, and for logical and definite
taxpayer predictability, its holding period should follow the "pro-
duction of income" principles presently applied in the area of short
sales6 3 and collapsible corporations. 4 Consequently, the asset should
be considered "held" when its construction is completed, or, in the
alternative, when it is first placed in the use for which it is intended.
Until such completion or use, the taxpayer should be considered to
possess inchoate rights in the capital gains possibilities of his asset.
The resolution of these problems has been substantially obstructed
by judicial reactions to changing concepts of property. This impedi-
ment has been described by a leading jurist in the following manner:
In the United States . . . the . . . conception of property as an absolute
right... has persisted longer than anywhere else. This is due largely to the
support given by the Supreme Court, as interpreter of the Constitution, to
a rigidly individualistic interpretation. Grants of title to land, and eventually
all property rights, were elevated into inalienable natural rights, and the
power of taxation . . . strictly limited.65
Indeed, the persistent and contradictory lip-service paid to "title." as
well as the results of the Paul, Draper, and Williams cases, seem quite
consequential when viewed against this conclusion, even though they
contradict the oft-quoted truism that the tax law must be practical
66
It was a similar statutory construction that motivated Mr. Justice
Cardozo to declare for the Supreme Court:
Refinements of title have at times supplied the rule when the question has
been one of construction and nothing more, a question as to the meaning of
63. "[T]he holding period of such substantially identical property shall be considered
to begin (notwithstanding section 1223, relating to the holding period of property)
on the date of the closing of the short sale, or on the date of a sale, gift, or other
disposition of such property, whichever date occurs first....." INT. REV. CODE: OF
1954, § 1233(b) (2).
64. "[F]ollowing the completion of such manufacture, construction, production, or
purchase." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d) (3).
65. FmDmANN, LEGAL THEORY 486 (3d ed. 1953).
66. See, for example, Mr. Justice Roberts' statement to this effect in Helvering v.
New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 471 (1934). See also Hayes v. United States,
227 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1955) (the "language of the [Internal Revenue] Act
must be taken in context and must be considered in light of the purpose sought to be
accomplished"); Commissioner v. Schock, Gusmer & Co., 137 F.2d 750, 754 (3d
Cir. 1943) (where the court is confronted with equally available routes leading
to different results, in determination of a tax matter, practical considerations rather
than technical niceties should point the way); Pleasants v. United States, 22 F. Supp.
964 (Ct. Cl.), aft'd, 305 U.S. 357 (1938) ("consistency in theory is not necessary in
matters of internal revenue").
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a taxing act to be read in favor of the taxpayer. Refinements of title are
without controlling force when a statute, unmistakable in meaning, is
assailed by a taxpayer as overpassing the bounds of reason, an exercise by
the lawmakers of arbitrary power. In such circumstances the question is no
longer whether the concept of ownership reflected in the statute is to be
squared with the concept embodied, more or less vaguely, in common law
traditions. The question is whether it is one that an enlightened legislator
might act upon without affront to justice. .. . Liability may rest upon the
enjoyment by the taxpayer of privileges and benefits so substantial and
important as to make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he were the
owner, and to tax him on that basis.6
In summation, it can only be concluded that "enlightened" congres-
sional action is long past due if the area of capital gains holding is to
possess that consistency and predictability that is the law's aim. The
confusion and the difficulty caused by the content and implications of
the McFeely decision demand legislative attention.6 8 For, as Edmund
Burke has pointed out, there is a limit at which forbearance ceases to
be a virtue.
67. Commissioner v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 678 (1933).
68. Some recent decisions indicating the confusion and/or the possibility of taxpayer
abuse are, First Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Tenn. 1962)
and Dorman v. United States 296 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1961). In First Am., taxpayer was
allowed capital gains treatment on the disposition of stock sold to an adversary group
in a proxy battle, taxpayer transferring the proxy power prior to the six month period
but retaining the title specifically for the tax advantage. In Dorman, taxpayer received
the preferential treatment from the relinquishment of an interest in an executory
contract to acquire a partnership interest. The Ninth Circuit held that the period began
on the contract date even though the interest disposed of resulted entirely from the
subsequent activities of the taxpayer. This, of course, contradicts the Armstrong case at
note 35 supra.
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